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The aim of the research was to analyze the effect of managerial 
ownership, foreign ownership, government ownership, ownership 
concentration, and percentage of shares of multiple large shareholders 
on audit fees. The independent variables were managerial ownership, 
foreign ownership, government ownership, ownership concentration, 
and percentage of shares of multiple large shareholders; while, the 
independent variable was audit fees. All non-financial companies listed 
in the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2013-2015 were sampled. 
Proportionate stratified random sampling was applied to 207 sampled 
companies verified using slovin formula and multiple regression analysis 
to test the hypothesis of the research. This research found that the 
managerial ownership and the percentage of multiple large shareholders 
were negatively affected audit fees. Moreover, government ownership 
positively and significantly influenced audit fee; while, foreign 
ownership and ownership concentration had no significant effect on 
audit fee.
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INTRODUCTION 
As part of corporate responsibility 
for the implementation of corporate 
activities, the management of the company 
is required to issue financial reporting to 
shareholders. Before issuing, the financial 
statements should be audited by auditor to 
ensure the quality of the financial 
statements. Beside internal auditors, external 
auditor to which the company must pay for 
the auditing services; the auditing fees 
associated with the auditor are also called 
audit fees (Wahab, Zain, & James 2011); all 
fees provided by corporate and paid to 
external auditors for conducting auditing. 
The audit fees exists because shareholders 
and company management are in conflict of 
interest. As management mostly tend to act 
according to their own interests, 
shareholders require a supervision by an 
independent party of the company's 
management, and the expenses incurred for 
such monitoring are called audit fees.  
The audit fee spent by companies 
varied as a result of different ownership 
structures and different control mechanisms 
used by shareholders to oversee companies’ 
affairs, including financial reporting 
processes. Previous studies identified audit 
fees paid to external auditors varied 
according to the client's ownership structure 
(Khan, Hossain, & Siddiqui 2011; Partner 
and Hossain 2007; Adelopo, Jallow, & Scott 
2012). In addition, the belief of the external 
auditor on the company's internal control 
also varied according to its ownership 
structure. Therefore the difference level of 
complexity on audit work was used by 
external audit company to determine the 
amount of audit fees charged to clients. 
This study used variables of 
ownership structure consisting of 
managerial ownership, foreign ownership, 
government ownership, concentration 
ownership, and shares percentage of 
multiple large shareholders as independent 
variables; while, audit cost was the 
dependent variable. 
Agency theory is one of the relevant 
theories mostly used to explain how 
corporate ownership structures affect audit 
costs. Given a good corporate governance 
mechanism, shareholders increased the 
oversight upon the company's management 
to decrease the occurrence of 
mismanagement and financial reporting 
misstatement.  
Principal and agent interaction was 
deeply discussed in agency theory (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). In their relationship, 
shareholders and managers signed in a 
contract in which the managers had to 
perform its functions following the interests 
of the shareholders. In this case, mostly, the 
shareholders demanded the managers to 
increase the value of the company to 
generate maximum profit. However, in 
reality, the manager often disobeyed what 
the shareholders wanted them to do. As a 
result, agency problems raised resulted that 
the shareholders had to spend substantial fee 
called agency costs to oversee the managers.  
The split between company 
ownership and control of a company 
authorized by a manager potentially affect to 
the company's value adversely. Managers 
have a tendency to use power and 
opportunities they have to meet their own 
interests. Although shareholders have an 
authority to choose company directors, they 
do not have direct control over the company 
because they do not the ones running the 
company. Therefore, the shareholders were 
in need of services from external auditors to 
oversee the company's management. 
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The Effect of Managerial Ownership on 
Audit Costs 
In the agency theory, contract upon 
the relationship between shareholders and 
managers was explained (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). The efforts to avoid agency 
problem - conflict of interest between 
shareholders and managers - insider 
ownership or managerial ownership were 
needed to reduce cost of supervision that 
should be issued by shareholders. Jensen & 
Meckling (1976) further explained that 
managerial ownership could reduce agency 
problems arising from the separation 
between management and corporate owners 
by reducing agency costs, which come from 
the direct expropriation of funds by 
managers. Therefore, managers having their 
own shares could motivate management 
control (Fleming, Heaney, & McCosker 
2005). The higher the number of shares the 
managers has, the greater the value of the 
company should the managers increased. 
In the study of Mustapha & Ahmad 
(2011) in Malaysian business environment 
about the influence of managerial ownership 
based on agency theory showed that agency 
theory had predicted the inversely 
proportional relationship between 
managerial ownership and monitoring costs. 
This finding showed that the amount of 
auditing fees associated with the auditor 
would be lower if their directors or 
management owned most shares of the 
company. This was because directors and 
management had the ability to access 
personal information and the ability to 
properly manage the corporate resources. 
Therefore, firms with greater organizational 
ownership required less audit work. Based 
on the description, the first hypothesis is 
formulated: 
H1: Managerial ownership 
negatively affects audit costs 
 
 
The Influence of Foreign Ownership on 
Audit Costs 
According to Nelson & Mohamed-
Rusdi (2015), because of the complexity of 
financial reporting and a geographical 
separation, foreign-owned subsidiaries or 
companies with foreign ownership will pay 
more for auditing process. The complexity 
of the financial reporting is caused by the 
location of the parent company, which is 
stationed in deifferent country with different 
accounting rules. The previous literature on 
audit costs have identified the increasing 
cost of the audit following the financial 
report’s complexity of the clients (Abdullah, 
Ismail, and Jamauddin 2008; Salleh, 
Stewart, and Manson 2006; Goodwin-
Stewait & Kent 2006). The complexity of a 
company might cause agency problems 
based on which managers took advantages 
of geographical boundaries to meet their 
own interests. Meanwhile, as foreign 
investors expect to have highly auditing 
quality, the audit costs will also increase 
because auditor need to spend more time 
doing the audit details (Zureigat 2011). 
Therefore, the second hypothesis is 
formulated as  
H2: Foreign ownership positively 
affects audit costs.  
Government Ownership Impact on Audit 
Costs.  
The form of government ownership 
is slightly different from other forms of 
ownership. The state-owned companies are 
mostly financed by citizens' money; 
therefore, the government ownership is very 
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widespread. This makes free riders problem 
more real than any other form of scattered 
ownership. In the government ownership, 
shareholders do not have a strong 
willingness to oversee directly the 
management since each shareholder has only 
a small portion of investment in the 
company. In fact, the control of government-
owned enterprises is actually conducted by 
persons in the government (Shleifer & 
Vishny 1997).  
Although individuals within the 
government do not have the right to cash 
flow such as receiving dividends from the 
company, but their reputation will be at stake 
if the company fails. Most state-owned 
companies do not have enough costs for 
internal control such other types of 
ownership companies have. As a result, the 
internal control systems in the government-
owned companies tend to be weaker and the 
agency problems become higher. 
Consequently, external auditor is necessary 
to oversee the company's performance and 
operations. Shareholders in companies with 
government ownership rely more on audit as 
a means of controlling corporate 
management behavior (Chan et al., 1993). 
Thus, the third hypothesis was formulated 
as:  
H3: Government ownership 
positively affects audit costs  
The influence of ownership concentration 
on audit costs  
The more the stock block holders 
within a company are, the more concentrated 
the company will be. The number of stock 
block holders relate to oversight level to 
management as firms with high levels of 
ownership will have better levels of 
oversight resulting in lowering audit costs. A 
research in Malaysian business environment 
proposed the number of stock block holders 
as a measurement of the company ownership 
concentration. The study proved that highly 
concentrated ownership in firms have a 
significant effect on audit cost (Adelopo, 
Jallow, & Scott 2012). Therefore, the fourth 
hypothesis is formulated that  
H4: The concentration of ownership 
negatively affect the cost of audit 
The Influence of Share Percentage of 
Multiple Large Shareholders to Audit 
Cost  
As multiple large shareholders 
profoundly influence a company compared 
to common shareholders, the multiple large 
shareholders affect the cost of audit because 
they have more access to the company, such 
as assessing the financial statements before 
being published (El-gazzar 1998). Multiple 
large shareholders also tend to interfere in 
the company management with regard to 
earnings management done by managers. 
(Balsam, Bartov, & Marquardt 2002).  
Previous studies used percentage of 
investor ownership as a measurement of the 
ownership structure and as a method to 
oversight the management of the company 
(Adelopo, Jallow, & Scott 2012; Nitisari 
2015). Thus, the fifth hypothesis of this 
study is as follows:  
H5: The percentage of shares of 
multiple large shareholders negatively affect 
the cost of audit. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Research variable 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable was audit 
cost (LNAFEE) defined as the auditor's 
remuneration paid to the external auditor 
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5 
for doing audit services (Che-Ahmad & 
Abidin 2008; Al-Ajmi 2008). The Audit 
fees were measured in Indonesian Rupiah 
and the data were obtained directly from the 
company's annual report. 
 
Independent Variables 
Five independent variables used in 
this research were managerial ownership, 
foreign ownership, government ownership, 
ownership concentration, and percent share 
of multiple large shareholders. Measurement 
of each variable were conducted based on 
the following explanation. 
Managerial ownership 
This study used a common 
measurement for managerial ownership 
based on the total percentage of shares board 
of commissioners and directors possess to 
get a better picture of managerial ownership 
as proposed by Mazlina Mustapha and 
Ayoib Che Ahmad (2011); Al-Fayoumi and 
Abuzayed, (2009). 
Foreign Ownership 
Foreign ownership was operationally 
measured by the percentage of share 
ownership by foreign individuals or non-
individuals. Foreign individual is defined as 
a non-Indonesian citizen or a foreign 
national; while, foreign non-individual is 
defined as any company or organization 
registered or established outside of 
Indonesia. 
Government Ownership 
Government ownership in a 
company was measured by the share 
percentage owned by government. In this 
study, the government ownership within 
listed companies was identified through 
annual report disclosure regarding the 
majority of shareholders in a company. 
Concentration of Ownership 
Adelopo et al. (2012) categorized 
company into three groups: 
1. Widely held firms; if the company have 
multiple large shareholders owned by 
one to four people. 
2. Concentrated firms; if the company 
have multiple large shareholders owned 
by five to eight people. 
3. Highly concentrated firms; if the 
number of multiple large shareholders is 
more than eight people. 
The number of multiple large 
shareholders in a company shows the 
number of stock blocks holders owned by 
the company. The concentration of 
ownership can be measured by the number 
of investors within the company that have at 
least 5% of the total shares of the company 
in the annual financial statements. 
Share Percentage of Multiple Large 
Shareholders 
The percentage of shares of multiple 
large shareholders is the number of shares 
owned by multiple large shareholders 
(Adelopo, Jallow, & Scott 2012). Multiple 
large shareholders are shareholders with at 
least 5% ownership share. 
Sample Determination 
The population in this research was 
non-financial companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2013, 2014, 
and 2015. The non-financial companies in 
Indonesia consisted of eight business 
sectors, including agriculture, mining, basic 
industries and chemicals, various industries, 
consumer goods industry, property, real 
estate, and construction, infrastructure, 
utilities, and transportation; trade, services, 
and investment. The sample was determined 
by proportionate stratified random sampling 
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method; the sampling method was calculated 
in comparison with the proportion of each 
sector. 
Analysis Method 
Methods of data analysis used was 
four data analysis techniques, which are: 
1. Descriptive statistical analysis 
2. Classical Assumption Test 
a. Multicollinearity Test 
b. Autocorrelation Test 
c. Heteroscedasticity Test 
d. Normality Test 
3. Regression analysis 
a. Coefficient Of Determination 
Test (R2) 
b. Simultaneous Significant Test 
(F-test) 
c. Partial significance Test (T-test) 
4. Hypothesis testing 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Description of Research Sample 
Among 207 samples processed, the 
disturbing sample data were singled out and 
the final sample was 144. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Object of research 
No Description Number of  Companies 
1. Agriculture (21/428 x 207) 9 
2. Mining (43/428 x 207) 21 
3. Basic industry and chemistry (65/428 x 207) 33 
4. Various industries (43/428 x 207) 21 
5. Consumer goods industry (39/428 x 207) 18 
6. Property, real estate, and construction (54/428 x 
207) 
27 
7. Infrastructure, utilities, and transportation (51/428 
x 207) 
24 
8. Trade, services, and investment (112/428 x 207) 54 
9. Number of samples 207 
10. Outlier data (63)  
Data Observation 2013-2015 144 
Source: Secondary data processed 2017. 
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Variable Description 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Results 
Variable N Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
LNAFEE 144 6.517274 0.8115369 4.4716 8.1519 
MOWN 144 0.037974 0.1135822 0 0.7 
FOWN 144 0.381367 1.1238277 0 0.9631 
GOWN 144 0.103066 0.2399096 0 0.8066 
MLS 144 2.5556 1.52269 1 7 
SHARE 144 0.716154 0.1581142 0.2048 0.9776 
Source: Secondary data processed, 2017.
Table 2, the result of the descriptive 
statistical analysis, shows that the average 
value of the dependent variable of LNAFEE 
is 6.517274, standard deviation of 
0.8115369, a maximum value of 8.1519, and 
a minimum value of 4.4716. As the average 
value is greater than the standard deviation 
value, the variation in the data was relatively 
small as the value of each sample was about 
the average of the count value. In addition, 
the average value of the audit cost was 
relatively larger than that of the statistical 
test results, meaning that most of the 
companies sampled spent a considerable 
audit cost.  
Meanwhile, as the independent 
variable MOWN has an average value of 
0.037974, a standard deviation of 
0.1135822, a maximum value of 0.7, and a 
minimum value of 0, in the sample there 
were companies’ shares not owned by the 
board of directors or the board of 
commissioners proven by the average value 
was smaller than the that of standard 
deviation. This explained that the variation 
of the data in the research sample was 
relatively large. In addition, the statistical 
test results showed that the relatively small 
average of the managerial ownership 
indicated that most companies sampled were 
not dominated by managerial ownership.  
Furthermore, as the independent 
variable FOWN has an average value of 
0.381367, a standard deviation of 
1.1238277, a maximum value of 0.9631, and 
a minimum value of 0, in the sample there 
were companies that their shares were not 
owned by a foreign party proven by the 
average value was smaller than that of 
standard deviation. This showed that the 
variation of data in the research sample was 
relatively large. In addition, as value of the 
average foreign ownership was relatively 
small, most companies sampled were not 
dominated by foreign ownership.  
As the independent variable GOWN 
has an average value of 0.103066, a standard 
deviation of 0.2399096, a maximum value of 
0.8066, and a minimum value of 0, in the 
sample there were companies that their 
shares were not owned by the government 
proven by the average value was smaller 
than that of standard deviation. Thus, the 
variation of the data in the research sample 
was relatively large. In addition, the average 
value of the government ownership was 
relatively smaller than that of the statistical 
test results, indicating that most companies 
sampled were not dominated by government 
ownership.  
Moreover, as the independent 
variable of MLS has an average value of 
2.5556, a standard deviation of 1.52269, a 
maximum value of 7, and a minimum value 
of 1, the non-financial corporation in 
Indonesia sampled in this study did not have 
multiple large shareholders more than 8 to be 
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categorized as highly concentrated firms. In 
addition, the results obtained that as the 
average value was greater than that of the 
standard deviation, the variation in the data 
was relatively for the value of each sample 
was around the average of the count. 
Meanwhile, the statistical test results 
showed that as the average value of 
ownership concentrations was relatively 
small, most companies sampled were widely 
held firms.  
In addition, the independent variable 
SHARE has an average value of 0.716154, a 
standard deviation of 0.1581142, maximum 
value 0.9776, and minimum value 0.2048. 
As the average value was greater than that of 
the standard deviation, the variation in the 
data was relatively small because the value 
of each sample was around the average of the 
count. In addition, statistical test result 
revealed that the average percentage value of 
the multiple large shareholders was 
relatively large, indicating that most 
companies sampled were dominated by 
stockholders (above 5% ownership)  
Discussion  
The result of the classical assumption 
test revealed that the regression model used 
in this study passed the multicollinearity test 
with tolerance value above 0.1 and VIF 
value below 10 for all independent variables; 
while, the heteroscedasticity test using 
Glejser test was significance at 0.05 for all 
independent variables, and the normality test 
of by using one sample of Kolmogorov-
Smirnov was significance at 0.05 level for 
the residual regression model.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Regression Test Results  
Variable Value Β t  Sig. 
MOWN        -
0.142 
      -
2.043 
    
0.043** 
FOWN  0.016 0.229 0.819 
GOWN  0.195 2.599   0.010* 
MLS  0.121 1.599 0.112 
SHARE        -
0.542 
      -
7.757 
  0.000* 
F test 16.385    
F sig   0.00*    
R2 0.35    
Output of multiple regression of SPSS, 
2017  
The result of the first hypothesis 
(H1) testing of MOWN against LNAFEE 
showed that the t value was -2.043 and the 
significance value was 0.043, meaning that 
MOWN significantly influenced LNAFEE; 
therefore, H1 is accepted. Thus, the 
magnitude of the percentage of the 
managerial ownership shares affected the 
audit cost of the company. This finding was 
in line with the one of Niemi (2005) and 
Mustapha & Ahmad (2011) stating that the 
greater the percentage of the managerial 
ownership shares is, the lower the company's 
audit costs will be.  
The result of the second hypothesis 
(H2) testing of FOWN against LNAFEE 
showed that the value of t was 0.229 and of 
significance was 0.819, meaning that the 
foreign ownership had no significant effect 
on the audit cost; therefore, H2 was rejected. 
This was because the level of the complexity 
of the foreign ownership companies could 
not be determined by the large percentage of 
The Influence Of .... (Anandya, Prasetyo) 
 
 
9 
the foreign shares in the company. The 
complexity of the financial reporting in the 
foreign firms was caused by the inter-state 
accounting rules differences resulted from 
the geographic separation between the 
stockholders and the management of the 
company. In addition, the foreign investors 
from countries with similar characteristics to 
Indonesia could also be the cause, such as 
developing countries or Asian countries 
whose accounting rules were not much 
different from that of Indonesia. This result 
was in line with the finding of Niemi (2005) 
stating that the percentage of foreign 
ownership shares has no significant effect on 
audit cost.  
The third hypothesis (H3) of GOWN 
against LNAFEE showed that that value was 
2.599 and the significance value was 0.010, 
which meant that there was a significant 
influence between GOWN and LNAFEE; so 
that, H3 was accepted. It could be concluded 
that the large percentage of shares of the 
government ownership affected the 
company's audit cost. This finding supported 
the research result of Nelson & Mohamed-
Rusdi (2015) stating that the greater 
percentage of the government ownership 
shares is, the more increasing the company's 
audit cost will be.  
The fourth hypothesis (H4) of MLS 
against LNAFEE showed that the t value 
was 1.599 and the significance value was 
0.112. These values could be interpreted that 
the concentration of the ownership did not 
significantly affect the audit cost, so H4 was 
rejected. The reason was that in the 
ownership of shares in Indonesia the 
majority shareholders had more authority to 
conduct supervision compared to minority 
ones. The majority shareholder was those 
whose ownership was above 50% or those 
whose ownership was obtained by merger 
the minority shares up to more than 50%. 
Therefore, it could be concluded that 
regardless the number of multiple large 
shareholders in the company, the significant 
effect would not exist as long as the multiple 
large shareholders could not achieve the 
majority share. The authority to supervise 
the management of the company was 
preferred to be the majority shareholders.  
The result of the fifth hypothesis 
(H5) testing of SHARE against LNAFEE 
showed that that value was -7.757 and the 
significance value was 0.000, meaning that 
there was a significant influence between 
SHARE and LNAFEE, so H5 was accepted. 
Therefore, the large percentage share of the 
multiple shareholder shares affected the 
audit cost of the company. This was in line 
with the one of Adelopo et al. (2012) and 
Nitisari (2015) stating that the greater 
percentage of the shares of the multiple large 
shareholders the lower the company's audit 
costs will be. 
 CONCLUSION 
Conclusion 
The aim of the study was to analyze 
the effect of ownership structure on audit 
costs on non-financial companies listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in the 
period 2013-2015 using 144 samples. In 
addition, managerial ownership and 
percentage shares of multiple large 
shareholders significantly and negatively 
affect audit cost. While, government 
ownership significantly and positively 
influences audit costs. Otherwise, foreign 
ownership and the concentration of 
ownership does not significantly affect audit 
cost. 
Limitations  
Some limitations or weaknesses of 
this research consist of factors affecting 
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audit costs in this study consist of only five 
ownership structure variables; while, there 
are many other factors that can affect the cost 
of corporate audit. In addition, this research 
only takes 69 companies sample each year 
from 428 non-financial companies listed on 
BEI. 
Suggestions 
Based on the results and the 
limitations in this study, the suggestion is to 
add other variables that are expected to 
affect the company's audit costs; so that, the 
results would be even better by providing 
research results that explain factors outside 
of this research model that may affect audit 
costs. Furthermore, adding research samples 
so that data that will be used can be more 
accurate and more varied compared to this 
research. 
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